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The law is a potential site for socio-political contestation. Legal systems
may be open to competing interpretations and applications, because they
are not necessarily coherent, and abstract legal concepts are not necessa-
rily determinate. Nevertheless, the ability of legal actors to destabilize (or
stabilize) legal categories and expose the incoherence of the legal system
(or to present it as coherent) depends on the availability of maneuvering
space and on the actors’ willingness and ability to do the necessary work
to achieve these eﬀects (Kennedy 2008). Therefore, in order to examine
the law’s role in a particular country, one has to take into account not
only the letter of the law, but also its judicial interpretations and
applications as well as its eﬀects in a particular context.
Israeli law, the subject of this chapter, is not monolithic. Zionist
ideology inﬂuences Israeli law, but ideologies are rarely homogenous,
and diﬀerent actors within legal systems strive to advance their own
conceptions and interests. Yet, an examination of the role of the legal
system since Israel’s inception reveals that far from signiﬁcantly
challenging power structures, Israeli law eﬀectively created a hierarchy
among Israeli citizens. As I show here, it generally advanced, justiﬁed,
and perpetuated a separate and inferior status for the Palestinian citizens
in Israel. At the same time, it granted the Israeli regime an aura of
legitimacy by containing its practices under the “rule of law.”
Ultimately, although the legal system has a moderating eﬀect – because
it often pushes the political system toward the political center – this
center itself has been moving toward the right-wing continuum of the
Zionist movement.
The chapter is organized as follows: Part I examines the
conventional story about the rise of constitutionalism and judicial
activism in Israel. I question the analytical utility of this story in
evaluating the role of law in Israeli society. The chapter shows that, at
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least with respect to the Palestinian citizens, the Supreme Court was
far from the counter-majoritarian hero who stood in defense of basic
rights. Part II examines three primary areas in which the legal system,
and the Court in particular, contributed to the “subordination” – that
is, systematic disadvantaging – of the Palestinian citizens. Israeli legal
structures have facilitated the dispossession of Palestinian land,
the establishment of inferior and diﬀerentiated citizenship, and the
segregation of Arabs from Jews in housing and education. I use the
word “structures” to convey that this injustice is a result of resilient
institutional practices (as opposed to a moral failing on the part of
few individuals). I use “structures” in the plural to convey that these
practices are irreducible to an overarching “function” of a “coherent”
legal system. I show how the legal and judicial deployment of see-
mingly neutral and technical legal categories eﬀectively obscures this
subordination while simultaneously justifying, shaping, and
advancing it. Part III discusses some of the rhetorical and legal
tools the Court deploys to justify its deferential attitude toward
state power and oppressive practices: security, thin rulings, political
questions, general questions, delay, ripeness, and facially neutral
jurisprudence. This by no means suggests that the Court’s
performance has been uniform and monolithic. Part IV mentions
three examples of cases in which the Court moderated excessive or
peripheral cases of discrimination: political participation, free speech,
and state subsidies. Yet even in these cases, the Court aﬃrmed the
state’s Zionist ideology, and its rulings were often ineﬀective given
the delay in delivering rulings, the Court’s dependency on other
branches to enforce its rulings, and the lack of implementation by
these branches.
The Conventional Story: The Rise of Judicial Activism?
Constitutionalism is often understood as the “rule of law” rather than the
arbitrary “rule of men” and requires the imposition of constraints on
politics (Sultany 2012a). The conventional story in Israeli legal history is
one of ascendance from an absence of a written, codiﬁed constitution to
the rise of constitutionalism and the increasing inﬂuence of the discourse
of rights. These were achieved through a stronger role played by
the Israeli judiciary, which started to exercise the power of judicial
review – that is, the power to review the conformity of legislation and
state policies with supra-political norms. Supporters of this activist
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judiciary consider this activism as necessary for the protection and
vindication of rights and the separation of powers. Yet detractors
consider this activism a form of usurpation of power from the hands of
popularly elected branches of government.
The Absence of a Written Constitution
Israel failed to enact a constitution, despite the fact that both the UN
Partition Resolution 181 and the Israeli Declaration of Independence
required such an enactment. Following this requirement, an interesting
debate took place in which the opponents of promulgating
a comprehensive, formal constitution prevailed. David Ben-Gurion –
the founder of the state and leader of the ruling party Mapai – and the
religious parties were the main opponents. Consequently, on June 13,
1950, the Knesset adopted the “Harari resolution” compromise,
according to which the Knesset’s Constitution, Law, and Justice
Committee would be in charge of drafting the constitution through
a series of Basic Laws.
Scholars usually point out that the reasons for the failure to adopt
a constitution include (Cohen 2003) the following: the heritage of the
British Mandate, which did not include constitutionally protected
human rights; the socialist and illiberal perceptions of many of the
Zionist leaders; Mapai’s desire to safeguard its coalition with the
Religious Front; and Mapai’s desire for “unhampered freedom to
govern” (Sager 1976:93). Yet the arguments against the adoption of
a written constitution included the following (Cohen 2003; Goldberg
1998; Kohn 1954; Sager 1976; Sapir 1999; Shapira 1993): (1) Only
a minority of the Jewish people reside in Israel, and the state does not
have the right to tie the hands of the Jewish people with a rigid
constitution; (2) the state is in its formative years with an ongoing
immigration of thousands of Jews, and there is a need for uniﬁcation
before a constitution can be adopted; (3) the debate over
a constitution requires addressing the most fundamental issues in
the life of the state and the people. These kinds of discussions
might endanger the unity of the people and lead to a “cultural war”
between the secular and religious parties; (4) as exempliﬁed by the
British experience, the rule of law can be maintained and the free-
doms can be secured without a written constitution; and (5) religious
parties further claimed that the Torah is the constitution of the Jewish
people and there is no need for another constitution. These parties
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rejected the notion of popular sovereignty and recognized divine
sovereignty as the source of legitimacy.
These arguments betray ideological orientations that perceived the
formation of the state as an ongoing project of Zionist nation building,
and did not consider Israel an ordinary nation state, because the majority
of the ethnically and religiously-conceived nation resides outside the
state. It also shows that religious arguments played a role in rejecting
secular constitutionalism. In addition, Nadim Rouhana argues that the
“founding fathers” needed some time to “incorporate the spoils of the
war with the Palestinians – the enormous property that Palestinians left
behind – and to employ these spoils for the beneﬁt of Jewish society,” and
that “constitutional eﬀorts could have hindered the designs of the
founding fathers” (Rouhana 2004:1). Indeed, Israeli legislators were
concerned that a constitution would undermine security legislation,
speciﬁcally the emergency regulations (which allowed for the seizure of
Palestinian property, as I explain next; Karp 1993).
The Rise of Constitutionalism
Israeli scholars often argue that Israeli legal consciousness has moved
from a formalist, technical, inductive conception of the law in the ﬁrst
three decades of Israel’s history toward a value-oriented, purposive,
educative conception of the law during the 1980s and onward
(Mautner 1993). Alongside this change in legal reasoning and concep-
tions of the law, a change occurred in the role of the Supreme Court.
The Court’s early approach was deferential toward the legislative and
executive branches. In the ﬁrst decades of the state, the Court tried to
establish its institutional legitimacy and ability to curb the power of the
executive branch, which exempliﬁed an “Eastern European background
of czarism, Bolshevism, and authoritarianism that shaped the conscious-
ness of Israel’s ruling elite and contributed to the rise of étatism (mam-
lakhtiyut) in the early 1950s” (Lahav 1997:100). Facing these non-liberal
attitudes, the Court deployed a Zionist, collectivist, “nationalistic liberal-
ism” (Oz-Salzberger and Salzberger 1998). Following this approach, the
Court challenged the executive on only a few occasions and based on
formal, procedural, and technical justiﬁcations (see, e.g., Peretz 1958).
On the rare occasions in which the Court stepped outside technical
reasoning and resorted to an overt normative and substantive reasoning,
it more often than not endorsed the prevailing Zionist consensus. For
instance, the Yardor (1965) case dealt with the disqualiﬁcation of al-Ard’s
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Socialist Arab List from the Knesset’s elections.1 The Court approved this
disqualiﬁcation despite the fact that the list met all the procedural
requirements, and the law did not enumerate any substantive ground
for disqualiﬁcation. The fact that the Arab left-wing list had a democratic,
secular, and egalitarian agenda for all citizens made it diﬃcult for the
Court to justify its disqualiﬁcation on notions of “defensive democracy.”
Instead, the Court chose a doctrine of “defensive Zionism”
(Oz-Salzberger and Salzberger 1998). The Court approved this disquali-
ﬁcation because it considered the list to undermine the “fundamental
constitutional premise” of the continuity of Israel as a Jewish state.
Even in the celebrated case of Kol Ha’am (1953), the Court can hardly
be seen as a counter-majoritarian hero who defended extreme or
marginal minority voices against governmental suppression.2 In that
case, the Court defended the right to free speech by imposing
a restrictive “clear and present danger” standard for assessing
governmental regulations of free speech. Accordingly, it rejected the
state’s closure of the Arabic and Hebrew communist newspapers,
which were vocal critics of the state’s policies. However, seen in historical
context, the Court joined in this ruling the “societal center” (Rozin 2006).
Indeed, mainstream newspapers and the Journalists’ Association were
very critical of the government’s decision to close these newspapers and
saw it as their interest to defend freedom of speech (Rozin 2006). Thus,
although the Court’s ruling contradicted the government’s position, it
was consistent with inﬂuential mainstream voices. In any case, this ruling
remained largely ignored in the Court’s jurisprudence for three decades
as the Court hardly referred to it in its subsequent rulings (Saban 2011).
The Court became an “activist” court and abandoned this deferential
posture toward the executive and legislative branches given their inability
to resolve controversial and political issues – such as questions of state
and religion – that ended up at the Court’s docket. The culmination of
the changes in the Court’s stature, power, and jurisprudence occurred in
the 1990s with the enactment of two basic laws – Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom. These laws
constitutionalized for the ﬁrst time the values of Israel as a “Jewish and
democratic” state. They also introduced for the ﬁrst time a partial list of
rights. The enactment of these Basic Laws at that speciﬁc time originates,
1 E.A. 1/1965Yardor v. Central Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset, P.D. 19 (3) 365
(1965).
2 H.C. 73/1953 Kol Ha’am Co. v. Minister of Interior, P.D. 7 871 (1953).
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at least partially, in the desire of some legislatures to entrench certain
legal and political arrangements against the backdrop of the change in the
constellation of the Israeli ruling elites from secular to religious and from
Ashkenazi to Mizrahi Jews (Kimmerling 2001). Thus, the threatened
cosmopolitan and neoliberal elites sought to insulate their preferred
arrangements from majoritarian decision-making by delegating these
issues to the judiciary, which shared these values (Hirschl 2000).
Glaringly, the Israeli legislature omitted equality from this list of rights.
The reason for this omission was the fear that the imposition of
egalitarian norms would undermine the Jewish character of the state.
Accordingly, equality might upset the religious-secular status quo within
the Jewish majority by weakening the status of religion and the religious
establishment, and might undermine discrimination against the
Palestinian citizens (Karp 1993). The failed attempts of Palestinian
lawmakers to introduce the formal principle of equal protection of the
laws into Israeli law illustrate that the Knesset feared that formal equality
might undermine the Jewishness of the state (Sultany 2003).
Nevertheless, former Chief Justice Aharon Barak considered this
constitutionalization of rights as a “constitutional revolution” that
granted the judiciary the power to review the validity of legislative acts.
The Limits of Judicial Intervention
Yet there are many reasons to doubt the simplistic conventional wisdom.
The notion of “judicial activism” has been subjected in recent years to
critical scrutiny. To begin with, there is no agreed-upon,
non-controversial, neutral baseline that demarcates the legitimate
boundaries of judicial intervention and according to which “activism”
and “passivism” can be assessed (Sultany 2012a). Indeed, the dichotomies
between activist/passivist and substantive/proceduralist courts are hard
to defend. The theoretical distinction between passivism and activism
merely obfuscates the real political diﬀerences (Seidman 2001). Theymay
be more accurately seen as two sides of the same coin and as diﬀerent
postures of judicial and legal politics. The diﬀerence between them is one
of visibility of intervention. It is a diﬀerence in degree rather than kind.
Tribe writes: “Judicial authority to determine when to defer to others in
constitutional matters is a procedural form of substantive power; judicial
restraint is but another form of judicial activism” (Tribe 2000:xvi). In this
sense, a passive court is always already an activist court and vice versa.
Likewise, a proceduralist court is always already a substantive court and
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vice versa. Even so-called substantive courts often claim that their review
focuses on processes and procedures and distinguish between “legality”
and “merits.” Thus, arguably, they generally produce a limited and
ineﬀective protection of rights (Galligan 1982).
Additionally, the wealth of recent scholarship questions the activist
reading of judicial intervention: Empirical studies show that supreme
courts never stray far from mainstream public opinion (Friedman 2010);
historical research shows that judicial rulings may de-radicalize demands
for social change (Forbath 1991), have little eﬀect on the reality of
subordinated minorities (Klarman 1996; Rosenberg 2008), and may
also produce a backlash from conservative actors (Klarman 2006).
Comparative inquiry shows the gap between law in the books and law
in action and the ineﬃcacy of judicial activism as in the case of some
rulings of the Indian Supreme Court or the question of advancing socio-
economic rights (Cassels 1989; Krishnan 2003).
These critiques are relevant to the Israeli Court’s record. From the
story of the rise of judicial activism and of a liberal Court challenging the
other branches of government and spreading the discourse of rights,
some Israeli scholars exempt two major areas of judicial decision-
making: cases dealing with the occupation of the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip (Sheleﬀ 1993), and cases dealing with the expropriation of
lands from the Palestinian citizens (Holzman-Gazit 2007). Indeed, the
Court limited only the excessive practices of the occupation regime, but
not its ordinary operation (Kretzmer 2002), and legitimated its practices
and overall structure (Shamir 1990; Sultany 2007, 2014). Likewise, the
“constitutional revolution” left no signiﬁcant marks on the land regime
inside Israel and provided very few protections to Palestinian landholders
(Holzman-Gazit 2007).
Land and occupation, however, are not the only areas of law that are
inconsistent with the image of an activist Court. The gap between law in
the books and law in action is evident in the very limited eﬀect of the
Court’s intervention in political agreements, political appointments, and
political allocations (Barak-Erez 2002). Furthermore, with respect to
social rights, the Court exercised a minimalist, rather than an activist,
approach (Barak-Erez and Gross 2007). Simultaneously, it enforced
a conservative anti-distributive approach to economic rights that pro-
tected the status quo (Gross 1998). This shows that “activism” is not
necessarily progressive. Additionally, the story of the transformation
from form to substance and values is challenged by the existence of
a signiﬁcant “exception,” which is constitutional law (Segev 2006).
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Finally, scholars cite the Court’s concern about its legitimacy as an
explanation for its early deferential attitude. Yet this concern did not end
after the ﬁrst three decades. In fact, the increasing power of the Court
made it more vulnerable to critiques and attacks by other branches and
substantial segments of the Jewish population (Saban 2008). Consider,
for instance, the judges’ vocal opposition to attempts by the Minister of
Justice Daniel Friedmann in 2008 to curtail judicial power through
changes in the appointments’ method of Supreme Court justices or
empowering the legislature to override judicial rulings (Yoaz 2008).
Consider also the 250,000 ultra-orthodox demonstrators who expressed
in February 1999 their rejection of the Court’s interventions in religious
questions (Sontag 1999). Thus, the Court’s perceived vulnerability and its
need to maintain its legitimacy inﬂuence its choice of a course of action –
whether its primary orientation is “formalist” or “substantive,” “passi-
vist” or “activist”.
This chapter does not seek to evaluate the overall performance of the
Court or, more generally, the Israeli legal system. Rather, I focus on
the main ways in which this system has inﬂuenced or contributed to
the subordination of the state’s Palestinian citizens. Unlike the previously
mentioned conventional accounts, I will not distinguish between
diﬀerent periods or Courts, because my argument will be that the eﬀect
of subordination remains overall similar despite the changing legal tools
and postures. There is no necessary connection between one form of legal
consciousness (whether “formalist” or “substantive”) and judicial
posture (whether “passivist” or “activist”). And there is no necessary
connection between the latter and subordination. Law is relatively auton-
omous. As such, it does not necessarily reﬂect or mirror the interests of
ruling elites (Kennedy, The Rise and Fall, 2006; Tushnet 1977). Legal
consciousness – the social practice and understanding of the law –
mediates the inﬂuence of ideologies and interests on concrete arrange-
ments and institutions (Kennedy, The Rise and Fall, 2006). It eﬀectively
reproduces and legitimates power structures and systems of privilege, but
it does not reproduce them in the same way; that is, it maymoderate their
inﬂuence and limit their excesses.
In Israel’s case, legalism (the belief that outcomes in judicial rulings
follow from applying legal reasoning to the legal materials) and the rule
of law (the semblance of legality) – whether in the formalist or the value-
oriented mode – mediates the inﬂuence of Zionist ideology through
negotiating the contradiction between Jewishness and democracy (as in
denying its existence or reconciling it through modiﬁcations). But by
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doing so, the law shapes this Zionist ideology and contributes to its
evolution. Legalism imposes a false necessity by obscuring the
intertwinement of law and politics and the inescapable legislative and
policymaking role of the judiciary (Kennedy 1998; Posner 2008). The law
is not necessarily a coherent gapless system. Judges resolve gaps,
ambiguities, and contradictions in the law by choosing among alternative
policy choices. The law does not necessarily mandate these choices;
rather, they are related to, inﬂuenced by, and contribute to political and
ideological debates (Kennedy 1998). This implicates the judiciary in an
active lawmaking role regardless of the visibility of judicial intervention
(whether the judge is “activist” or “passive”). In this sense, the law did not
mirror Zionist ideology; rather, it constituted it.
Law and Control?
An example of an instrumentalist conception of the law as
“mirroring” Zionist ideology is to perceive the law as a servant of a control
system. FollowingLustick’smodel of control–which includes segmentation,
economic dependency, and cooptation of minority members (Lustick
1980) – Saban (2011) argues that in the ﬁrst three decades, the law was an
“able servant” of the control systemwithin a project of colonization. Despite
the admission that the control system itself may contain a tension between
diﬀerent interests, such a functionalist view risks either lapsing to
a reductionist instrumentalist conception of the law (according to which
the law is a mere “servant”) or a totalizing discourse (in which legal
developments that are contrary to the control model are represented as
legitimating devices for the control system) (Saban 2011:339).
I reject this view for several reasons. First, not all legal rules and
institutions are oppressive and seek to control; some rules are
“facilitative,” providing citizens with tools to pursue social or economic
activities (Tushnet 1977). In other cases, the law can be a strategy in
warfare (Kennedy, Of War and Law, 2006). It can play a constitutive role
in humanizing and civilizing the colonized (Esmeir 2012). Legal rules can
indirectly inﬂuence citizens’ lives (as in libel suits that touch upon the
historical memory of Arab citizens; Bilsky 2011). Control may be one of
the eﬀects of legal arrangements if it is understood narrowly (as in
security legislation to control political protest). If deﬁned broadly
(to include all aspects of the Palestinian minority’s interaction with the
legal system: control of land, people, consciousness, memory), however,
it loses its analytical utility, because it lumps together too many diverse
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practices and arrangements. For instance, if control means governance or
regulation, then every legal system seeks to control citizens.
Secondly, the legal system might not be the most important
component in a control system. Control can be achieved in various
other ways, such as by establishing an extensive intelligence apparatus
and an elaborate system of recruiting informants (Cohen 2009, 2010).
The eﬃcacy of this control can also be achieved given several historical –
social, political, economic – factors and contingent upon them (Smooha
1980).
Thirdly, both the instrumentalist and totalizing conceptions
ignore the law’s indeterminacy. Whether gaps, ambiguities, and
contradictions in Israeli law have been used to improve or
subordinate the status of the Palestinian citizens is a question that
requires examining the eﬀects of the deployment of legal tools. Yet
one cannot deduce a function from observing eﬀects (Hunt 1985),
because there is no necessary correspondence between the eﬀects
and the form of law. Legal actors may produce diﬀerent eﬀects from
the same legal language under diﬀerent circumstances. In this sense,
functionalism is legalistic, because it assumes that these eﬀects are
legally mandated.
Fourthly, reducing the law to a mere servant of the function of control
misses the active and constitutive part of the law. It is exactly given the
existence of gaps, ambiguities, and contradictions that the judiciary does
not just apply the law, but also makes the law. As mentioned earlier,
Israeli law does not merely reﬂect Israeli politics; it also mediates state
ideology and shapes it. It is, then, a mistake to scrutinize the law’s role
through the ends that a political regime pursues and ignore the law’s
internal politics and constitutive role (Esmeir 2012).
Therefore, in contrast to functionalist approaches, I do not posit an
overarching function of the legal system nor an inherent feature in it.
Unlike instrumentalist approaches, I maintain that the judiciary is
a policymaker and does not mechanically reﬂect political will. Israeli
law’s seemingly neutral and general language is potentially
indeterminate and permits judicial discretion. Nevertheless, as will
become apparent next, disagreements among or between the judges
and the political branches are relatively limited. Ultimately, legal
arrangements systematically disadvantage the Palestinian citizens
vis-à-vis the Jewish citizens in the distribution of material and
symbolic beneﬁts and resources.
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Subordination by Law
In this section, I describe brieﬂy the primary ways in which Israeli law is
implicated in dispossessing the Palestinian citizens, in granting them
a diﬀerentiated and precarious citizenship status, and in segregating
them from the Jewish majority.
The Legal Structures of Dispossession
Through the ethnic cleansing of Palestine, the Zionist movement
transformed Palestine from an Arab majority country into a Jewish
majority state (Pappé 2006). This transformation was by no means
merely demographic. Jewish ownership by 1948 comprised about 8.5%
of the lands (6.6% according to Jiryis 1973; Kedar 2001). Yet after 1948
and by the 1960s, the situation was reversed, with the state and the Jewish
National Fund owning 93% of the lands inside Israel (Kedar 2003).
In 1960, the Basic Law: Israel Lands deﬁned “Israel lands” as those
owned by the state, the Development Authority, or the Jewish National
Fund. It declared that the ownership of these lands “shall not be
transferred either by sale or in any other manner.”
The lands that the state appropriated did not include only the spoils of
war (refugees’ property) in the immediate aftermath of the war; they also
included Palestinian citizens’ lands that that state expropriated. At the
time, as the Palestinian community inside Israel grew from 156,000 in
1948 to 1.4 million in 2013, the state transferred most of these citizens’
private lands to its control. An elaborate legislative and judicial apparatus
has enabled the state to make these changes and to create a land regime
congenial to the needs of the ongoing formation of an ethnocratic settler
regime (Forman 2011; Holzman-Gazit 2007; Jiryis 1973; Kedar 2001,
2003; Kretzmer 1990; Mehozay 2012a). Ethnocracies seek to utilize the
country’s resources for the beneﬁt of an ethnic group whose members
control and dominate its decision-making institutions to the exclusion of
citizens who do not belong to this group (Yiftachel 2006). Settlers’ law –
and especially the supreme courts’ jurisprudence – uses many seemingly
neutral, technical, and procedural legal tools that justify and facilitate the
appropriation of natives’ lands for the beneﬁt of the settlers (Dakwar
2000; Kedar 2003).
One major component of the legal structures of dispossession in Israel
is the seemingly technical category of “absentee.” Through this category,
the law disconnects the native from his historical entitlements and his
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homeland. At the time the law entrenches the war’s outcome, it white-
washes the spoils of war by ignoring the context of raw power that
severed civilians’ relationship with their property and homeland.
The Absentees’ Property Law – 1950 eﬀectively deﬁned every
Palestinian refugee as an absentee whose property could be transferred
to the Custodian of Absentee Property. The deﬁnition was so broad that
anyone who left the areas controlled by Zionist military for a short period
of time between November 29, 1947, and May 15, 1948, to an adjacent
Palestinian or Arab territory could be considered an “absentee” (Peretz
1958). Even those who remained in their homes, which happened to fall
under Jordanian control during the war until their territory was
transferred to Israel in the Rhodes Armistice Agreement of 1949, became
“present absentees” (Jiryis 1973; Kedar 2003). The Custodian had very
broad powers to declare persons as “absentees” and their property as
“absentee property.” Contributing to this process, the Court imposed the
onus of proof regarding title over land on the “absentee” landowners
rather than on the state that seized their lands (Kedar 2003). In order to
whitewash this land grab and make it permanent, the Custodian trans-
ferred the seized lands to the Development Authority. The latter, in turn,
“sold” these lands to the state and to the quasi-state body, the Jewish
National Fund. The latter, along with the government’s representatives, is
part of the Israel Land Administration that governs and regulates all state
lands in Israel.
In other cases, the state exploited the Ottoman category ofMewat land
(uninhabited and uncultivated land) to expand its holdings. Accordingly,
the Court developed evidentiary rules that expanded the Mewat cate-
gory – and hence state land – and rejected oral and written evidence that
the landowners provided (Kedar 2001). The Land (Acquisition for Public
Purposes) Ordinance – 1943, a British Mandate law that Israeli law
incorporated, authorized the minister of ﬁnance to seize lands for “any
public purpose.” The state used this Ordinance to seize Arab lands in
order to establish new Jewish communities (Kretzmer 1990).
Other legislation relied on the existence of the military regime that the
state imposed exclusively on the Palestinian Arab citizens from 1948 to
1966. This regime curtailed their basic rights, including strict limitations
of the right to movement under a pass permits regime administrated by
military governors who regulated Arab access to the labor market and
suppressed their political activities. For instance, Article 125 of the
Defense (Emergency) Regulations – 1945 empowered military comman-
ders to declare certain areas as “closed areas.” Likewise, the state used
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security measures and pretexts through the Emergency Regulations
(Security Zones) – 1948. These regulations empowered the defense
minister to declare “security zones.” These military orders prevented
landowners or village residents from physically being in and using
their property. Finally, the Emergency Regulations (Cultivation of
Uncultivated Land) – 1949 authorized the minister of agriculture to
seize “uncultivated” lands. Occasionally, the state used these legal tools
simultaneously to dispossess an Arab landowner: a land in a security zone
or closed area remained uncultivated and thus allowed the minister of
agriculture to seize it on the grounds that it is uncultivated (Jiryis 1973).
These few examples show that Israel went to considerable lengths to
legalize its actions in order to present them under the aura of “rule of
law.” The state, however, appropriated a “considerable amount of
land . . . with no legal basis at all, or based on provisional laws” between
1951 and 1953 (Forman and Kedar 2004). These appropriations were
retroactively legalized through the Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts
and Compensation) Law – 1953.
It is unclear whether the existence of a written constitution would have
hindered some of these measures of dispossession, as the founding
fathers may have feared. It is clear, however, that the right to private
property became a constitutional right in the Basic Laws of the 1990s only
after most of the Palestinian citizens’ lands have been taken away. This
constitutionalization of property rights eﬀectively entrenches this dis-
possession, because it protects existing property relations and presents
them as a neutral baseline (Gross 2004). This entrenchment is facilitated,
on the one hand, by the Supreme Court’s general conception of property
rights as possessive – and hence very protective of current property
owners – rather than distributive (Barak-Erez and Gross 2007). On the
other hand, the Court’s jurisprudence of dispossession with respect to
Arab property rights continued after the enactment of the Basic Laws
(Holzman-Gazit 2007). This jurisprudence is manifested, for instance, in
approving very broad deﬁnitions of the public purposes that justify land
conﬁscation. In a recent case regarding the Lajjun lands, the Court
rejected an appeal by Arab landowners.3 The state seized the Lajjun
lands (200 dunams) in 1953 according to the abovementioned Land
Acquisition (Validation and Compensation) Law. The ﬁnance minister
3 C.A. 4067/2007 Muhammad Khalil Abdelfattah Jabareen and 486 others v. State of Israel
(2010). Last accessed July 29, 2013 (http://elyon2.court.gov.il/ﬁles/07/670/040/E01/
07040670.E01.pdf).
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issued a certiﬁcate stipulating that the lands are taken for “vital settlement
and development needs.” However, the lands were used for forestation
only. In 2007, the landowners requested the Court to annul the expro-
priation, given the fact that the state did not use the land for the speciﬁed
goals despite the passage of more than 50 years. The petitioners relied on
a 2001 landmark ruling in which the Court ordered the government to
oﬀer Jewish landowners the right to regain ownership of their private
land that the state had conﬁscated for a public purpose, but ceased to use
it for that purpose. In that case, the state seized the land for military
training and after three decades changed the public purpose, and decided
to establish a residential neighborhood on that land.4 In the case of the
Arab owners of Lajjun, however, the Court ruled that forestation falls
within the “settlement and development” goals of the state. The Court
reasoned that the interpretive inﬂuence of the new Basic Laws is limited,
and the Land Acquisition Law is exceptional and needs to be interpreted
according to its time.
The story of dispossession is incomplete without the denial of Bedouin
land rights in the Naqab in southern Israel. Ronen Shamir, who reviewed
the Court’s rulings on Bedouin land rights, argues that the question
cannot be reduced to a binary between “nomads” and Western
conceptions of property. Rather, this binary – as the Court constructs
it – is itself part and parcel of the Bedouins’ dispossession (Shamir 1996).
On the one hand, the Court constructs the Naqab as an empty space
waiting for (Zionist) redemption, and perceives the Bedouin as nomads
even when they reside in permanent communities (ibid.). On the other
hand, the law facilitates their concentration in speciﬁc townships.
Bedouin are allowed to reside and build only in designated places; all
the other places are considered state lands. Thus, the law transforms
them from citizens with claims over disputed lands into lawbreakers of
the Planning and Construction Law – 1967, which the state enacted long
after many of their communities have existed. In light of this, state law
transforms the conﬂict between the Palestinian Bedouin and the state
from a collective question into individual criminal cases (ibid.).
The record of the Israeli Court, then, does not display a “jurisprudence
of regret” in which the settler-colonial society critically reviews its history
of dispossession of the indigenous peoples (Webber 1995; as observed by
Gross 2004). This attitude was evident in the 1992 Australian case of
4 H.C. 2390/1996 Yehudit Kersik et al. v. State of Israel, Israel Land Administration, P.D. 55
(2) 625 (2001).
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Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2),5 in which the High Court rejected legal
doctrines that justiﬁed the dispossession of aborigines. Speciﬁcally, the
High Court rejected the doctrine of terra nullius (no man’s land) and
recognized native title as part of the common law and as predating the
British colonization of Australia in 1788. The Court referred to the
history of land acquisition as “a national legacy of unutterable shame.”
The Israeli Court’s record also diﬀers from the Canadian ruling in
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997),6 in which the Canadian
Supreme Court recognized the evidentiary weight of oral history
in proving title over land. The eﬀect of these rulings has hitherto been
limited on indigenous rights in Australia and Canada. Nevertheless, they
point toward a direction never taken by Israel’s Supreme Court.
The Legal Structures of Diﬀerentiated Citizenship
Diﬀerentiated citizenship is not necessarily objectionable. Many scholars,
especially multiculturalists, have criticized notions of universal
citizenship and formal equality (Fiss 1976; Kymlicka 1996; Young
1987). Yet these are critiques of the insuﬃciency of formal arrangements
to guarantee genuine equality to disempowered groups and historically
oppressed minorities. These are critiques that seek to supplement formal
equality with a substantive notion of equality. Nonetheless, some Zionist
scholars use these critiques of formal equality to justify preferential
treatment of the dominant Jewish majority (Yakobson and Rubinstein
2009; for a critique, see Sultany 2010). Diﬀerentiated citizenship in Israel
is objectionable because it is practiced against the backdrop of the lack of
formal equality.
The Court’s jurisprudence subordinates notions of equality to
Jewishness as a Grundnorm (basic norm). Indeed, this is manifested
even in the celebrated case of Qa’adan (2000) in which the Court
declared discrimination against non-Jews in land allocation and hous-
ing illegal.7 In this case, an Arab family’s application to purchase
a house in the community of Katzir was rejected on the grounds that
Katzir was established for Jews. Chief Justice Barak used the
metaphor of the state as a Jewish house whose key the state gives
exclusively to Jews via the Law of Return. He claimed that those who
5 Mabo v. Queensland (No.2), 175 CLR 1 (1992).
6 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 79 DLR (4th) 185 (B.C.S.C.) (1997).
7 H.C. 6698/1995 Adel Qa’adan v. Israel Land Administration et al., P.D. 54 (1) 258 (2000).
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are already inside the house are entitled to equal rights. Chief Justice
Barak then is implying a distinction between rights over the land and
rights in the land. Only Jews are entitled to the former, whereas the
Arab citizens are entitled to the latter only (Sultany 2005). Indeed, the
Court’s inclusion of the Arab citizens is conditioned upon stripping
them from their collective Palestinian national identity and endorsing
a forward-looking perspective that ignores the past injustice
committed against them (Jabareen 2002). Furthermore, in some
cases (like the housing case of Bourkan and the religious budgets
case discussed later in the chapter), the Court uses notions of
substantive equality in order to deny formal equality for Arab citizens
and justify preferential treatment of Jewish citizens.
Yoav Peled captures this diﬀerentiated and unequal status when he
argues that Israeli Jews’ status is one of republican citizenship while Arab
citizens’ status is one of liberal citizenship (Peled 1992). In republican
citizenship, the bearer of the citizenship is part of the national group that
owns the state and is part of the deﬁnition of the common good.
By contrast, the bearer of liberal citizenship is entitled to individual rights
and is not part of the communal deﬁnition of the public good. In fact, in
the case of the Arab citizens, the public good is deﬁned at their expense,
as in the case of land ownership (Rouhana 1998).
Some scholars mistakenly conceive certain diﬀerentiated arrange-
ments as if these were acts of granting group rights to the Arab citizens,
such as in education, exemption from military service, and religious
status (Rubinstein and Medina 2005; Saban 2011). Thus, the fact that
Arab citizens have a separate educational system is taken to exemplify
self-government rights in education. Yet these scholars’ own acknowl-
edgment that this self-government is “extremely limited” (Rubinstein
and Medina 2005) undermines this argument. In other cases, like the
exemption of Palestinian citizens from military service, these scholars
wrongly consider the arrangement as a right (Rubinstein and Medina
2005; Saban 2011). Yet the practice of exempting the Arab citizens from
compulsory conscription is not entrenched in a legislative act. This
practice is not a legally protected interest (and hence a “right”), as it
does not give rise to a legal claim by those who are bearers of this alleged
right. In other words, the practice does not correspond to a duty upon the
state not to recruit Arab citizens. The state is under no duty to exempt
them. Should the security establishment decide to send recruitment
orders to some – or all – Arab citizens, the latter cannot argue in
a court of law that they have a right to be exempted. The petitions
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challenging the exemption of the Ultra-Orthodox Jews from military
service are instructive. The Court ruled in February 2012 that the Tal
Law, which enshrines this exemption, is unconstitutional.8 Furthermore,
the fact that the army does recruit those Arab citizens who are Druze or
Bedouin shows that this exemption is not granted to all Arab citizens as
a national group.
Likewise, group-based religious rights do not reﬂect recognition of the
Arab minority as a national group. Rather, religious communities are
granted jurisdiction over personal status, including those comprising
the Arab minority. The state is willing to grant Arab citizens religious
rights but not meaningful national rights (Karayanni 2012). Moreover,
these religious rights substitute for, rather than complement, equality.
The state, in this case, delegates religious jurisdictions against the back-
drop of lack of separation between religion and state; that is, it does not
proﬀer equal status to the diﬀerent religious groups. Rather, Israel
endorses one religion and merely tolerates others (Dworkin 2006).
Religions are privatized because the public sphere is Judaized and,
consequently, debates on religion and state are conducted from the
perspective of Jewish domination (Karayanni 2006).
In this section, I revisit the Arabs’ citizenship status given recent
developments. I address three primary aspects of Arab citizenship: citi-
zenship and nationality; citizenship and family life; and citizenship and
loyalty. I argue that while the diﬀerence between the republican and
liberal citizenships is evident in the ﬁrst instance of diﬀerentiation, the
“liberal,” individualistic citizenship is undermined by the second
instance, and then further undermined by the third instance.
Between Citizenship and Nationality
The legal system creates two tracks for acquiring citizenship: the
Citizenship Law and the Law of Return. It is only the latter that serves
as Israel’s nationality law (Tekiner 1991). The Knesset enacted the
Citizenship Law only in 1952, four years after the establishment of the
state, whereas it enacted the Law of Return – which grants every Jew
around the world the right to Israeli citizenship by virtue of being a Jew
and immigrating to Israel – in 1950. Prior to the enactment of the
Citizenship Law, the British Mandate’s Palestine Citizenship Orders
8 H.C. 6298/2007 Yehuda Resler et al. v. The Knesset (2012). Last accessed July 29, 2013
(http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files/02/270/064/a22/02064270.a22.HTM).
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(1925–1942) remained legally valid, and the state registered residents
according to the Residents Registration Ordinance of 1949. For some
authors, this suggests that Israel had no “citizens” – in the strict sense of
the word – between 1948 and 1952 (Margalith 1953). In fact, the delay in
the enactment of the Citizenship Law was due to concerns about dual
nationality and racial discrimination. Regarding the former, the law
allowed dual nationality (i.e., Diaspora Jews who wanted to acquire
Israeli citizenship could still retain their previous foreign citizenship).
Regarding the latter, the law created diﬀerentiated citizenship. Indeed,
the enactment of the Law of Return prior to the Citizenship Law
exempliﬁes not only the extreme importance of the Law of Return in
the Israeli constitutional structure, but also the distinction between
nationality and citizenship in Israel and the precedence of nationality
status over citizenship status.
Some authors justify the Law of Return on cultural grounds, on
preferential immigration policies, or on maintaining connections with
compatriots (e.g., Yakobson and Rubinstein 2009). Yet these arguments
ignore both the violent conditions that allowed the emergence of a Jewish
majority in the wake of the deliberate expulsion of the majority of the
Palestinian people and the constitutive role the law plays in maintaining
this majority status (Zreik 2008). The law is not comparable to other
repatriation measures, because the Jewish majority is a recent immigrant
community; the majority of the Jewish people reside outside the state;
and the law is ideological as it considers even Jews who were born inside
Israel as those who acquired their citizenship through the Law of Return
(Sultany 2010).
The backdrop for the gap between nationality and citizenship is the
lack of alternative inclusive nationality (“Israeli nationality”). That is,
there is no nationality that citizens are entitled to by virtue of being
citizens and without diﬀerentiation according to their religious, national,
and ethnic aﬃliations. The Supreme Court endorsed this gap between
nationality and citizenship when it rejected in the Tamarin (1970) ruling
an attempt to designate a citizen’s identity as Israeli rather than Jewish in
the identity card issued by the Ministry of Interior.9 The state opposed
a similar attempt 33 years later by a group of Jewish and Arab petitioners
by claiming before the Court that registering the nationality as Israeli
rather than Jewish or Arab would undermine the foundations on which
the state was established (Yoaz 2004). The petitioners withdrew their
9 H.C. 630/1970 Tamarin v. State of Israel, P.D. 26 (1) 197 (1972).
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petition to the Supreme Court on procedural grounds and resubmitted to
the District Court in its capacity as an Administrative Court. The District
Court rejected the petition on grounds of non-justiciability. Judge
Solberg – who became a Supreme Court Justice afterward – reasoned
that there is no legal recognition of an Israeli nationality, and the Court
cannot create such a nationality ex nihilo.10 The Supreme Court rejected
the petitioners’ appeal, notwithstanding its decision that the question is
justiciable. The Court highlighted that the petitioners ignored or
obscured the diﬀerence between nationality and citizenship; that the
“constitutional Jewishness” of Israel leaves no room for “Israeli
nationality”; that the Tamarin ruling’s conclusion regarding the lack of
existence of an Israeli nationality remains valid; and that the petitioners
failed to prove the evolution of such a nationality since the Tamarin
ruling.11 Thus, the Israeli legal system rejected attempts to create an
inclusive nationality for Arabs and Jews that would create an Israeli
civic nation composed of all citizens. The legal bond between the state
and a person, then, remains diﬀerentiated: It privileges those who belong
to the dominant ethnic-religious community.
Between Citizenship and Family
Another method of acquiring citizenship is naturalization. In Israel,
naturalization generally requires: residency in the country for
a speciﬁed number of years, intent to settle in Israel, knowledge of
Hebrew, and the renunciation of foreign citizenship. Because Jews can
acquire immediate citizenship through the Law of Return, this procedure
applies only to non-Jews. If the Israeli legal system couched the legal
arrangements described in the previous subsection in ethnic-religious
terms, it defended the legal rules governing naturalization on dubious
security grounds. The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary
Order) – 2003 suspends the naturalization of spouses of Israeli citizens if
they were from the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and
Iran. This law follows an earlier governmental decision in May 2002 to
suspend these naturalizations (Sultany 2003). Despite the classiﬁcation of
the law as a Temporary Order, it has been in eﬀect since 2003 through
multiple extensions. In 2006 and 2012, the Court upheld the law’s
10 District Court (Jerusalem) 6092/2007 Ornan et al. v. Minister of Interior (2008). Last
accessed July 29, 2013 (www.daat.ac.il/daat/maamar.asp?id=136).
11 C.A. 8573/08 Uzi Ornan et al. v. Ministry of Interior (2013). Last accessed October 16,
2013 (http://elyon1.court.gov.il/ﬁles/08/730/085/m15/08085730.m15.pdf).
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constitutionality despite its discriminatory nature and its violation of
civil rights. The law is discriminatory – notwithstanding its neutral and
general language – because it virtually exclusively impacts the Palestinian
citizens who are more likely to have spouses from these countries than
are Israeli Jews.
The law eﬀectively forces the Palestinian citizen whose spouse resides
in one of the listed Arab territories and states to make a diﬃcult choice:
Either have a family life outside the state (a choice, as we shall see next,
that may lead to revoking citizenship) or to give up the family unit in
order to stay in the state and hold on to the citizenship status (Davidov,
Yuval, Saban, and Reichman 2005).
In upholding the law as constitutional, the Court approved dubious
national security arguments. The state argued that terrorists might use
their acquired citizenship status to perpetrate attacks inside Israel. Yet it
was obvious to some of the dissenting judges that this security
justiﬁcation is unfounded.12 Indeed, for the minority judges the
individualized case-by-case, graduated process of naturalization that
existed prior to the ban on family uniﬁcation seemed more appropriate
for security examination than a blanket, sweeping ban. Such a ban
“amounts to an extreme case of proﬁling on the basis of national origin”
(Barak-Erez 2008:185). Justice Cheshin, writing for the majority in 2006,
acknowledged the collective injury caused to the Arab citizens by this
blanket ban. Yet he imposed a sense of necessity by claiming that it is
unavoidable in “times of war” in which the extremely destructive actions
of the few justify curtailing the rights of all the members of their
community.13 The split in the justices’ opinions shows that a diﬀerent
outcome was available in Israeli law. Yet the scope of disagreement was
limited. The main dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Barak did not
disagree with the majority as a matter of principle regarding the security
rationale and the propriety of the laws’ purpose. Rather, Barak disagreed
primarily regarding the proportionality of the violation of rights
(Jabareen 2007).
Then-prime minister Ariel Sharon acknowledged the dubious nature
of the security justiﬁcation in the debate on the extension of the law:
“There is no need to hide behind security arguments. There is a need for
12 See Justice Levy’s dissent in the 2012 ruling inH.C. 466/2007MKZhava Galon v. Attorney
General (2012). Last accessed July 29, 2013 (http://elyon2.court.gov.il/ﬁles/07/660/004/
O30/07004660.O30.htm).
13 H.C. 7052/2003 Adalah v. Minister of Interior, P.D. 61(2) 202 para 115 of Cheshin’s
opinion (2006).
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a Jewish state” (quoted in Ben and Yoaz 2005). Only two of the dissenting
judges in the 2006 ruling suggested that demographic considerations
motivated the enactment of the law. Yet demographic considerations
were implicit in other judges’ opinions (Ben-Shemesh 2008; Masri 2013).
The Court eﬀectively upheld the law’s demographic rationale and thus
legitimized the depiction of the Palestinian minority as a demographic
threat.
The rulings on family uniﬁcation exemplify the weakness of indivi-
dual, liberal notions of Palestinian citizenship inside Israel. The law
approved in these rulings suggests that the Palestinian citizens are
“inherently suspect” and unequal (Barak-Erez 2008). The interests of
state security, behind which lurks the demographic interest, supersede
the right to family life and to equality. This is, as Michael Karayanni
(2012:319) points out, a setback: If the Qa’adan ruling stripped the
Palestinian from her collective identity and history in order to prevail
over the state interest, in the family uniﬁcation cases, the individualized
Palestinian citizen loses before the state interest.
Between Citizenship and Loyalty
The expansion of the power to revoke citizenship is another measure that
security justiﬁcations obfuscate. On July 28, 2009, the Knesset amended
Article 11 of the Citizenship Law (Amendment No. 9) to empower the
Administrative Court to revoke citizenship, upon the interior minister’s
request, if a citizen committed a “breach of allegiance.” The Amendment
deﬁnes “breach of allegiance” as one of the following three acts: (1)
a terrorist act as deﬁned by the Prohibition on Financing Terrorism
Law – 2005, as well as assisting in the commitment or inciting to commit
such a terrorist act or active membership in a terrorist organization as
deﬁned by the said law; (2) treason or grave espionage (both violations of
the Penal Law – 1977); and (3) the acquisition of citizenship or the right
to permanent residency in one of the following states or territories: Iran,
Afghanistan, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, or the
Gaza Strip. Amendment No. 10, enacted on March 28, 2011, authorizes
courts to revoke citizenship as a form of punishment in criminal
proceedings in addition to any other punishment stipulated in the
Penal Law.
Amendments No. 9 and No. 10 are part of ideologically motivated laws
by right-wing Knesset members. Member of Knesset David Rotem, of
Yisrael Beiteinu, who initiated Amendment No. 10, declared: “There is
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no citizenship without loyalty” (quoted in Lis 2011a). This was the slogan
of Yisrael Beiteinu’s electoral campaign against the Palestinian minority
inside Israel. In particular, centrist and right-wing Jewish politicians
repeatedly accused minority leaders of disloyalty. The laws governing
charges of terrorism or support of terrorism are often very broad and
obscure. Thus, the security apparatus and Israeli establishment can abuse
them to criminalize dissent and reframe political opposition as
extremism or security threat. Indeed, “security” is not a neutral notion;
rather, it is part and parcel of the state’s ideology (Barzilai 2003).
Revoking citizenship becomes an ideological tool to punish Palestinian
Arab citizens for their political views and activism.
Indeed, some oﬃcials have increasingly attempted to revoke the
citizenship of Arab citizens and political leaders as a punishment for
their actions and views. Few of these attempts have materialized so far.
For instance, the minister of interior sought to revoke the citizenship of
the Palestinian Member of Knesset Azmi Bishara (National Democratic
Assembly), who left Israel after being suspected of “aiding the enemy
during war” (Khoury 2009). The minister also asked the Attorney
General whether he could revoke the citizenship of Member of Knesset
Haneen Zoabi (National Democratic Assembly) pursuant to her partici-
pation in the May 2011 freedom ﬂotilla to break the siege on Gaza
because her acts were “a premeditated act of treason” (quoted in Ravid
2010).
In contrast to this legislative expansion of the possible ways to revoke
the citizenship of a Palestinian, it is virtually unthinkable to revoke the
citizenship of a Jew. The bond between Jewish nationals and the state is
far stronger than the one between Palestinian citizens and the state. For
instance, Yigal Amir, an Israeli Jew, assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin on November 4, 1995. A petition to the Supreme Court demanded
that the minister of interior revoke his citizenship status. In response, the
Ministry of Interior claimed that even when a crime amounts to a breach
of allegiance, the minister is not obligated to revoke citizenship, because
reasonable discretion is still granted to the minister. The Court approved
the Ministry’s position and rejected the petition.14
Although measures for revoking citizenship impact a relatively small
number of Palestinian citizens, this diﬀerentiated approach exposes the
precarious status of Palestinian citizenship. It is based on weak and
unequal foundations, and the state may strip it if these citizens do not
14 H.C. 2757/1996 Hila Alrai v. Minister of Interior, P.D. 50(2) 18 (1996).
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behave according to the Zionist consensus that has been increasingly
lurching to the right in recent years. The Qa’adan ruling conceived the
Palestinian citizen as an individual rights holder with no title over
the homeland. In the family uniﬁcation cases, the Court compromised
the right to family life and equality in this bundle of individual rights
at the altar of the state’s interest in maintaining a Jewish demographic
majority. Loyalty laws further undermine the remains of this bundle of
individual rights because the state gives, and the state takes away.
The Legal Structures of Segregation
The vast majority of Palestinian citizens in Israel live in Arab commu-
nities. Only a small minority of these citizens live in the so-called mixed
[Arab-Jewish] cities. Virtually all school-age Palestinians – from
kindergarten to high school – study in Arab schools. Arab communities
are overcrowded, economically underdeveloped, with high poverty rates,
and deﬁcient schools (Sultany 2012b). Attempts by individuals to escape
the fate of low-quality life confront the reality of extremely limited social
mobility. One possible reason for this limited mobility is the prevalence
of stereotypes and racist attitudes toward Palestinian citizens among the
Jewish majority. The state education system, the militarization of Israeli
society, outspoken religious ﬁgures, and a sensationalist media all
nurture these attitudes (Bar-Tal and Teichman 2005; Peled-Elhanan
2012). They eﬀectively decrease the possibility that Jewish citizens
would rent or sell apartments to Palestinian citizens. However, the
main factors for low social and spatial mobility are legal and institutional.
Education
Segregation in education is manifested in the institutional separation of
the state education system into Arab and Jewish systems (the latter are
internally divided into secular and religious systems). The state education
system in the Palestinian community relegates Palestinian children
to second-class status (Coursen-Neﬀ 2004; Human Rights Watch
2001). The state discriminates against the Arab state education system
in virtually every respect. Admission policies of the universities further
disadvantage students coming from the periphery, as the heads of uni-
versities recognized when they decided in 2003 to change the admission
criteria to admit poorer Jewish students (Sa’ar 2003). The increase
in Palestinian students that followed this change alarmed the education
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establishment, and it quickly reverted to the previous admission criteria
(Sa’ar 2003). Additionally, medical schools introduced diﬀerent require-
ments that eﬀectively lowered the number of admitted Palestinian
students (Stern and Traubmann 2006; Traubmann 2007).
Furthermore, the state’s resources are dedicated to using the Arab
education system as an important tool for control and subordination
(Abu-Saad 2004; al-Haj 1995). The long-standing involvement of the
General Security Service in appointing educators based on political
considerations exempliﬁes this control (Ettinger 2004; Sultany 2004).
This control of the education system is part and parcel of the security
establishment’s general surveillance and political control of the minority
that continued after the formal dismantlement of the military govern-
ment in 1966 (Cohen 2010). In 2005, the state declared its intention to
cancel the position of a security service representative in the Arab
education system after Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority
Rights – petitioned the Supreme Court. Whether the security apparatus’s
interference in other ways will discontinue remains to be seen.
The legal system has contributed to this attempt to control the
education system – be it state or private institutions – through
a myriad of laws (such as the State Education Law – 1953; Education
Ordinance (New Version) – 1978; Supervision of Schools Law – 1969;
and The Civil Service (Discipline) Law – 1963). These laws sought to
restrict political activism in schools and used disciplinary measures
against teachers if they participated in political activities or exhibited
“improper behavior,” even if that activity occurred outside the school
itself (Saban 2011).
Moreover, the decentralized structure of local government law
perpetuates the Arab education’s separate and unequal status. As Yishai
Blank (2006) argues, the educational segregation is not a result of the free
choices of Jewish and Palestinian citizens. Rather, these choices and
preferences are shaped by the background rules that local government
law creates. These legal rules enhance segregation despite the seeming
absence of a formal and direct state-sanctioned policy of segregation.
Speciﬁcally, the “involvement of local governments in education . . . has
been made possible by the basic legal infrastructure, which gives local
governments seemingly ‘technical’ powers in education matters: place-
ment of students in schools; establishment of special and selective
schools; . . . and participation in funding schools within their jurisdic-
tions” (Blank 2006:371–372). Processes of suburbanization led to fears of
white ﬂight (wealthy parents leaving to smaller communities), and
214 nimer sultany
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107045316.008
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. SOAS - University of London, on 07 Jun 2019 at 11:11:14, subject to the Cambridge Core
disparities between localities and between neighborhoods led to dispa-
rities between schools. Blank argues that:
the shift from state funding to self-generated funding and the emergence
of competition between localities in Israel over economically strong
populations, have . . . exacerbated the disintegration of the public educa-
tion system and have contributed to the widening gaps within the
system . . . The principal victims of this phenomenon are pupils in
peripheral towns, in poor neighborhoods, and in Arab towns and villages.
(ibid.:374)
The taxing and zoning power of local municipalities contributed to these
processes (ibid.). For instance, residential segregation leads to segrega-
tion in education through enrollment zones (ibid.). Blank critiques the
lack of state intervention – to guarantee an equal baseline – and the
commodiﬁcation of education. The withdrawal of the state – especially
with the advancement of neoliberal policies – makes segregation in
education resilient. Although the background rules seem neutral and
technical, they have distributive outcomes and inﬂuence the incentives
and preferences of diﬀerent actors and citizens. Without attending to
these background rules, the separate and unequal education system is
likely to persist.
Housing
Segregation in education goes hand in hand with housing segregation
(Denton 1996). State law and policies in land allocation and housing
restrict the spatial mobility of young Palestinian couples. While the state
has established hundreds of Jewish communities, it has not established
any single new Palestinian town or village since 1948 (except in the forced
concentration of the Bedouin communities in poor towns that accom-
panied their dispossession from their ancestral lands and the demolition
of their villages). Quasi-governmental Zionist bodies whose status the
state has legally enshrined – the Jewish National Fund and the Jewish
Agency – played a major role of Judaizing Palestine and established gated
Jewish-only communities.
The Supreme Court contributed to this segregation. In a famous case,
it approved the refusal to sell an apartment to an Arab in East
Jerusalem.15 Bourkan – a former resident of the Jewish Quarter in East
Jerusalem – sought to purchase an apartment in the neighborhood.
15 H.C. 114/1978 Bourkan v. Minister of Finance, P.D. 32(2) 800 (1978).
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The legal challenge to the Jew-only selling policy failed, because the Court
justiﬁed this preferential and exclusive policy on grounds of the previous
historic expulsion of the Jews from the neighborhood. In other words, the
Court used the notion of aﬃrmative action – that is associated with
a substantive notion of equality and seeks to remedy historical patterns
of discrimination against minorities – to privilege the Jewish majority
and deny equal access to housing for Arabs.
Unlike the Bourkan ruling, the Court’s ruling in the Qa’adan case
(2000) advanced formal equality. Nonetheless, it hardly challenged the
segregation policies. Although it prohibited discrimination in housing
and land allocation, the Court limited its holding to the speciﬁc settle-
ment of Katzir. Moreover, the Court did not examine the decades-long
discriminatory land policies, nor did it examine the role of admission
committees in gated communities. Thus, it “may remain a symbolic
victory, as discrimination may continue behind a façade of [formal]
equality” (Gross 2004:90). Furthermore, the Knesset entrenched the
loophole of admission committees on March 23, 2011, when it enacted
the Cooperative Associations Ordinance (Amendment No. 8) – 2011.
This statute legalized the role of the admission committees and their
ability to reject candidates on grounds of “social incompatibility.” Given
public criticism, the statute includes a prohibition on rejecting candidates
on grounds such as race, religion, gender, and nationality. Nonetheless,
“social incompatibility” is a blanket and vague criterion that can be
applied in practice to eﬀectively exclude vulnerable sectors of the Israeli
citizenry, speciﬁcally the Palestinian citizens. The Supreme Court
rejected petitions seeking to invalidate the law and thus sanctioned
housing segregation. A majority of 5 out of 9 judges claimed that the
petitions lacked “ripeness” and enough factual basis for judicial
determination because the eﬀects of the law can be assessed only after
its implementation and in a case-by-case analysis. Some of the judges,
however, added substantive comments in which they rejected the logic of
“formal equality,” that Qa’adan exempliﬁes, and returned to the logic of
“substantive equality” to privilege the majority, that Bourkan
exempliﬁes.16
Despite the growing inﬂuence of globalization and neoliberal ideology
in Israel since the Bourkan ruling, the state continues to maintain
a strong presence in the market through multilayered cooperation with
16 H.C. 2311/11 and 2504/11 Uri Sabah et al. v. The Knesset, et al. (delivered on September
17, 2014).
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private actors in order to produce a spatial order congenial to
Judaization. Even in the so-called “mixed cities,” planning authorities
reproduce the de facto segregation between Jewish and Palestinian
populations (Falah 1996; Yacobi 2009). Separation walls exist not only
in the West Bank but also inside Israel, between Jewish and Arab
neighborhoods in the “mixed cities” Lydda and Ramle, and between
the adjacent communities of Caesarea (Jewish) and Jisr Al-Zarqa (Arab).
The separation between the communities is also an eﬀect of personal
law arrangements. Mixed Jewish–Arab marriages are extremely rare.
This rarity cannot be understood without the backdrop of the lack of
civil marriage in Israeli law, on the one hand, and the preservation of the
Ottoman legally sanctioned autonomous status of Jewish, Christian, and
Islamic religious authorities over personal status, on the other. These
legal and institutional arrangements eﬀectivelymake the prospect of such
mixed marriages even less likely.
The “Passive Virtues” of the “Activist Court”
The foregoing shows that seemingly apolitical categories (like absentee,
Mewat, breach of allegiance, mixed cities, and equality) advance and
conceal subordination of one ethnic group to another. This subordina-
tion is represented as either an outcome of law – rather than politics – or
of private choices rather than law. It thus conceals the intertwinement of
law and politics, and ignores the role of background rules in shaping
private choices. These representations allow the Court to deny its role in
the process of subordination. Another method of denial is the pretense of
non-intervention. Alexander Bickel (1986) suggested in his canonical
book that courts should deploy what he called the “passive virtues”:
a set of “procedural” devices that allow the court to refrain from deciding
cases on the merits when the application of general legal principles
hinders the required ﬂexibility for political expediency or when these
principles are controversial. These devices include standing requirements
(restrictions on petitioners’ access to the court), ripeness (temporal
restrictions according to which the issue is not ripe for judicial interven-
tion), and the political question doctrine (according to which the court
would refrain from deciding issues that are considered “political
questions” and hence nonjusticiable). Other scholars followed Bickel in
suggesting a form ofminimalism that leaves more room for the legislative
and executive branches of government and asks the courts to decide cases
on the basis of narrow and thin justiﬁcations (Sunstein 1999). These
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devices are suggested as an attempt to prevent judicial activism and
advocate for a deferential attitude vis-à-vis other branches. These are
devices for a minimalist court, and not an activist court. Yet critics of
these approaches have long pointed out that the deployment of
minimalist devices requires the court to use its political judgment and
thus it does not really extract the court from politics (Deutsch 1968;
Tushnet 2005).
In Israel, the Court’s political judgment on using avoidance devices is
entangled with the Court’s conception of its role within the Zionist
project. The Court, considered by many as an activist court, used minim-
alist devices. Although the Court expanded access to the court system by
minimizing the standing requirements, it used diﬀerent rhetorical and
legal devices to eﬀectively limit this access and, ultimately, aﬃrm state
power. These minimalist devices are largely “technical” or “procedural,”
but they allow the Court to deny responsibility. The consequences of this
judicial “non-intervention,” however, are detrimental to the status of the
Palestinian citizens. In what follows, I mention brieﬂy some of the devices
that the Court used to justify or show deference: security, thin rulings,
political questions, general questions, delay, ripeness, and color-blind
jurisprudence.
Security
Foot-dragging and delay in deciding controversial cases is a hallmark of
a reluctant judiciary. The Court exempliﬁed such hesitation in cases that
are related to security, even when security considerations were ostensibly
tenuous. In May 2012, the Court decided to reject the petition against the
long-standing emergency declaration.17 Israel has declared a continuous
state of emergency since its inception in 1948. This makes it an enduring
state of emergency and longer than, for instance, Egypt’s declared state of
emergency that lasted (with few interruptions) since 1958 and expired
only after the ousting of President Mubarak in 2011. In Israel, it took the
Court about 13 years to decide the 1999 petition against the declaration of
a state of emergency in the country. The Court noted that the extensive
legislation that made use of the emergency declaration often had no
apparent connection to security (as in ordinances related to economy
and consumerism; see also Lis 2011b). Yet, it granted the authorities
17 H.C. 3091/1999 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. The Knesset (2012). Last
accessed July 29, 2013 (http://elyon1.court.gov.il/ﬁles/99/910/030/t38/99030910.t38.pdf).
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more time to make the necessary changes despite the fact that the
government made few changes during the 13 years after submitting the
petition. Writing for the Court, Justice Rubinstein – who served prior to
his appointment as a legal advisor to the security establishment, a cabinet
secretary, and an attorney general – argued that “Israel is a normal state
that is not normal” given the security threats that it faces.
The long-standing nature of emergency powers and their diﬀerent
legal sources reveal that far from being exceptional measures addressing
security needs, these powers serve as a governing norm; rather than being
tools that suspend the law, they extend and channel state power under the
rule of law (Mehozay 2012b). Emergency regulations have been used
against Palestinian citizens and their political leaders long after the end of
the military regime in 1966. For example, the Supreme Court refused to
intervene in the travel ban issued by the minister of interior against the
political and religious leader Ra’ed Salah, who intended to visit the
religious sites in Mecca.18 It also refused to intervene in the travel ban
issued against the author, translator, and literary critic Anton Shalhat.19
In both cases, the Court heard the security apparatus representatives in
camera, and Salah and Shalhat had no way of challenging the alleged
evidence against them. The Court avoided writing an opinion in Shalhat’s
case and pressured the petitioner to withdraw his petition. These cases
exemplify the Court’s common and uncritical acceptance of the security
apparatus’s reasoning.
Thin Rulings
Security considerations often go hand in hand with “thin” rulings, as in
the case of the curtailment of prisoners’ rights. Following Hamas’s
capture of an Israeli soldier in Gaza in June 2006, the government
decided to worsen the conditions of the Palestinian prisoners, including
those who are citizens of Israel and are classiﬁed as “security” prisoners.
These new punitive measures included preventing the security
prisoners (but not the criminal prisoners) from pursuing an academic
18 H.C. 4706/2002 Shiekh Ra’ed Salah et al. v. Minister of Interior (2002). Last accessed July 29,
2013 (http://elyon1.court.gov.il/ﬁles/02/060/047/M05/02047060.m05.pdf).
19 H.C. 841/2006 Anton Shalhat et al. v. Minister of Interior (petition withdrawn). See
Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights. 2006. “Supreme Court Submits to
GSS Dictates and Does Not Cancel Order Banning Literary Critic . . . ” Adalah’s
Newsletter 24, April. Last accessed July 29, 2013 (http://adalah.org/newsletter/eng/
apr06/2.php).
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degree via correspondence from the Israeli Open University. These
measures persisted even after the Israeli soldier was released in
a prisoners’ exchange deal between Israel and Hamas in October 2011.
The District Court rejected the prisoners’ petition to allow them to
resume their education, and the Supreme Court rejected
in December 2012 their request for an appeal.20 The Court reasoned
that the discrimination against security prisoners is not an
impermissible discrimination. The thin nature of the Court’s ruling
exempliﬁed another hallmark of a minimalist court: The ruling consisted
of four short paragraphs and did not explain the Court’s conclusion
concerning the permissibility of discrimination in this case.21
“Political” Questions
At the time the Court expanded its rhetoric of judicial review and
intervened in the “nitty-gritty” politics (Barak-Erez 2002), it used
occasionally the “political question” argument to avoid intervening in
governmental decisions against Arab citizens (and also in petitions of
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, see Sultany 2002, 2014). This is
especially striking, not only because it reveals the political judgment of
the Court regarding when and where to intervene, but also because it
shows the Court’s unwillingness to intervene even when at face value the
state’s decision is ﬂawed. Consider the case of the Palestinian village of
Iqrith. The Israeli army occupied Iqrith in October 1948. A week later,
the villagers were requested to leave for 15 days for security reasons.
The Court ordered the army in an early ruling to allow the return of the
displaced persons to their village.22 The army reacted by destroying the
village (Peretz 1958). During the subsequent years, several government-
appointed committees recommended that the villagers return to their
village, but none of these recommendations or promises materialized
(Jamal 2011). In 2003, the Court rejected a 1997 petition by the displaced
villagers.23 The Court accepted the petitioners’ argument that the
20 P.A. 2459/2012 Said Salah et al. v. Israel’s Prison Service (2012). Last accessed July 29, 2013
(http://elyon1.court.gov.il/ﬁles/12/590/024/s07/12024590.s07.pdf).
21 The Court reiterated its position in a longer ruling in an expanded panel in April 2015.
Additional Hearing in H.C. 204/13, Said Salah et al. v. Israel’s Prison Service (delivered on
April 14, 2015). Last accessed September 3, 2016 (http://elyon1.court.gov.il/ﬁles/13/040/
002/C25/13002040.C25.pdf).
22 H.C. 64/1951 Dawood et al. v. Minister of Defence, P.D. 5 1117 (1951).
23 H.C. 840/1997 Awni Sabit et al. v. Government of Israel, P.D. 57(4) 803 (2003).
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security conditions that have justiﬁed their displacement are no longer
valid. It also acknowledged the governmental promises made to the
villagers. Nevertheless, the Court argued that this is a political question
in which the state has wide discretion. It also accepted the Sharon
government’s tenuous argument that allowing the return of these citizens
will be a precedent that will be detrimental to Israel’s vital interests
because it may be used in the context of the Palestinian right of return
in the Oslo process.
“General” Questions
In other cases, the Court justiﬁed its lack of intervention in the political
branches’ decisions by claiming that petitions regarding discriminatory
distribution of state resources are too “general” to warrant a judicial
remedy and lack a suﬃcient “factual basis.” In a petition against the
state budget, petitioners argued that a budget that grants Arab citizens
who comprise one-ﬁfth of the population only 1.86% of the Ministry of
Religious Aﬀairs budget is discriminatory. The Court rejected the
petition, maintaining that it refuses to be a “general supervisor” of the
state budget.24 It also claimed that the petition is general and lacked
a factual basis, despite the numbers the petitioners provided. The Court
reasoned that the focus should be on substantive equality rather than
formal equality, and this requires an inquiry into the religious needs of
every community. In the absence of such an inquiry, the petition is
general. This is a remarkable argument: As previously mentioned,
notions of substantive equality are normally used to allow minorities to
obtain equality beyond the formal measures given the persistence of
structural impediments and historical discrimination. Yet here the
Court uses substantive equality in order to deny formal equality.
Moreover, the Court is selective and inconsistent as it vacillates
between the general and particular in accordance with the case before
it. In the ban on family uniﬁcation cases, the Court approved a blanket
measure that supplanted the existing case-by-case system. Similarly, in
the political prisoners cases, the Court approved a general suspension of
the education privileges for all “security prisoners.” In contrast, in the
“admission committees” case, it deemed the petition general because it
lacked a case-by-case analysis of the law’s eﬀects. In the Religious Aﬀairs
budget case, it is unclear how speciﬁc should the petition be to avoid
24 H.C. 240/1998 Adalah v. Minister of Religious Aﬀairs, P.D. 52(5) 167 (1998).
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“generality” and provide suﬃcient factual basis.What is clear, however, is
that the Court’s intervention – whether requiring general or
“particular” analyses – disadvantaged the Palestinian citizens.
Delay
If the Sabit case mentioned earlier used the political question to reject the
petition of those displaced from Iqrith, the Court rejected an earlier
petition of the displaced because the petitioners were “late” in approach-
ing the Court.25 The petitioners challenged in 1981 the legality of
a Certiﬁcate that the minister of ﬁnance issued in 1953 and that transfers
Iqrith’s lands to the Development Authority. They also challenged the
military commander’s 1963 and 1972 closure orders of the village.
The Court reasoned in a few pages that the passage of a long period of
time hinders the ability to examine the considerations that guided the
state authorities in issuing these orders. The Court did not distinguish
between the 1972 and 1953 orders concerning the lapse of time. Despite
the sympathy that the Court expressed to the petitioners, it denied their
claim that the security conditions that prevented their return were no
longer valid given the “well known” fact “that requires no proof” that the
security conditions on the northern border adjacent to the village are not
peaceful. In other words, the security conditions cited by the Court were
not internal to Israel but external to it and bear no relationship to Iqrith
and the displaced.
Ripeness
The ruling on the so-called Nakba Law deployed a diﬀerent rhetorical
tool of deferential courts. If the previous case was rejected because it was
too late, here the case was rejected because it was premature.
The Budget’s Foundations Law (Amendment no. 40) – 2011 authorizes
the minister of ﬁnance to lower state funding of institutions or bodies
that organize events that reject the Jewish and democratic character of
the state or consider Independence Day as a catastrophe day. This law is
clearly directed against Palestinian citizens who present an alternative
narrative to the Zionist narrative and commemorate the Nakba (cata-
strophe), the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians. The Court rejected the
25 H.C. 141/1981 Iqrith’s Committee of the Displaced, Rameh Village et al. v. Government of
Israel, P.D. 36(1) 129 (1982).
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petitions against the constitutionality of the law despite the chilling
eﬀects of the law. The Court reasoned that the law’s impact couldn’t be
assessed prior to its implementation, and thus the question is not ripe for
judicial intervention.26 The Court made a similar argument in the above-
mentioned case concerning admission committees.
Color-blind Jurisprudence
Facially neutral discrimination in the distribution of beneﬁts and
resources complements the absence of formal equality. The criterion
of military service has operated as a pretext to discriminate against
Palestinian citizens, even though they are not legally required to serve.
This criterion has inﬂuenced housing and employment. Yet additional
criteria have proliferated over the years like tax and investment beneﬁts,
land development, and unrecognized villages. The Supreme Court has
allowed this facially neutral discrimination and legitimated it by
deploying a “color-blind” jurisprudence (Benvenisti and Shaham
2004). According to this approach: “If discriminatory policies can be
explained on any seemingly neutral grounds other than group-based
bias, they are upheld. The petitioner has the almost unattainable burden
of proving in court that group membership, rather than seemingly
neutral criteria, forms the basis of the challenged policy.” (ibid.:700)
By employing this jurisprudence, the Court allowed the growing dis-
parities between Arabs and Jews to proceed under the judicial
imprimatur.
Disparate impact under facially neutral criteria is evident also in lower
courts’ application of criminal law. Palestinian citizens who are suspected
of violating criminal law are more likely than Jewish citizens in a similar
position to be indicted, convicted, and sentenced to prison in lower
courts (Rattner and Fishman 1998). This shows disparity in the
application of criminal law and a harsher policy against Palestinian
citizens. During the military government period, the state criminalized
Palestinian citizens for violating the pass-permits regime that regulated
their movement and their access to the labor market (Koren 2004).
Criminalization is also evident in cases involving political speech and
popular protest in more recent times. The mass arrests of Palestinian
26 H.C. 3429/2011 Graduates of the Orthodox Arab College v. Minister of Finance (2012). Last
accessed July 29, 2013 (http://elyon1.court.gov.il/ﬁles/11/290/034/c04/11034290.c04.pdf).
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citizens in the October 2000 protests and the arrests following the protest
against the onslaught on Gaza (December 2008–January 2009) are exam-
ples of this phenomenon (see, e.g., Baker and Asali 2009; Rosenberg
2002).
Occasional Limits on the Excessive and the Peripheral
Although the subordination of the Palestinian citizens is the domi-
nant eﬀect of Israeli law, the intervention of the Supreme Court
occasionally limits excessive and peripheral cases of this subordina-
tion. By “peripheral,” I mean cases in which many liberal Zionists
would consider a particular instance of discrimination unrequired by
the Zionist or Jewish nature of the state or unnecessary to maintain
them. These issues are located in the penumbra rather than in the
core of the deﬁnition of the state as a “Jewish state” or as the “state
of the Jewish People.” The core issues include the demographic
question of maintaining a Jewish majority as we saw in the family
uniﬁcation cases. By “excessive,” I mean those cases that may
be related to the core issues but the methods of advancing these
core ends are themselves controversial, because many liberal Zionists
would consider them excessive. Had Chief Justice Barak’s opinion in
the family uniﬁcation case garnered the support of the majority in
the Court, it would have been another example of limiting the
excess. Ultimately, Zionism may house a spectrum of views and
thus does not necessarily determine the outcome in every case before
the courts. Nevertheless, the very fact that the concepts of Zionism
or Jewishness of the state – no matter how contestable – are the
concepts that frame the debate has important exclusionary eﬀects
from the standpoint of those whose political/normative identity is
deﬁned in opposition to Zionism or Jewishness.
I describe here brieﬂy three examples of this occasional moderat-
ing eﬀect: political participation, freedom of speech, and state sub-
sidies. Yet, as we shall see, limiting the excesses is often
accompanied by a judicial avowal of the mainstream ideology: either
by aﬃrming ethnocentric values (as in the case of political participa-
tion), or accompanied by a judicial condemnation of protected
individual Arab interests (as in the case of free speech). These are
not necessarily rhetorical tools, but indicate that the judges them-
selves are part of the dominant ideology. In the case of limiting
peripheral discrimination, the Court’s ruling is at times too late and
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ineﬀective to be consequential (as in the case of state subsidies). This
shows the weakness of the judicial system in the overall power
structure. This weakness is inconsistent with the image of
a powerful, interventionist Court.
It should be noted, however, that limiting the excessive and the
peripheral is not a consistent or coherent judicial strategy. Rather, it
is contingent on the speciﬁc case and its context as well as on the
composition of the Court. As many of the cases discussed in this
chapter show, it is not clear what cases the Court would consider
excessive and in which areas of the law. Yet this occasional moder-
ating eﬀect allows the overall power structure to persist while
providing it with a semblance of legality. This moderating eﬀect on
particular practices contributes to an overall eﬀect of moderation on
the socio-political system by pushing it toward centrism (Kennedy
1998). This centrism ensures that the power structure will not lean
drastically toward either the left or the right extremes of the Zionism
continuum: Contrary to left-wing hopes, as mentioned earlier, the
Court endorsed neo-liberal economic attitudes. Contrary to
right-wing hopes, the Court protected Arab political participation.
Political Participation
The state not only entrenches in its Basic Laws the Jewish character
of the state; it also further prohibits the political attempt to change
the rules of the game that are rigged for the beneﬁt of the Jewish
majority. The Basic Law: The Knesset may allow disqualiﬁcation of
political parties or individual candidates from participating in spe-
ciﬁc parliamentary elections if they explicitly or implicitly reject the
Jewish character of the state by demanding democratization
through equal status for all citizens. Article 7A stipulates that
a candidate or a candidates’ list may be disqualiﬁed from Knesset
elections if they explicitly or implicitly, through their goals or
actions: (1) deny the existence of the state of Israel as a Jewish
and democratic state; (2) incite to racism; or (3) display support of
an armed struggle of a hostile state or of a terrorist organization
against the state of Israel.
Unlike the previously mentioned Yardor case, the Supreme Court has
prevented several attempts in recent years to disqualify Palestinian
parties. In the case of the disqualiﬁcation of Azmi Bishara and the
National Democratic Assembly, a majority of a deeply divided Court
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(7 to 4) decided to reverse the disqualiﬁcation.27 Then-Chief Justice
Barak invoked the lack of evidence to justify his ruling. But in discuss-
ing Bishara’s advocacy of “a state for all its citizens,” Barak insisted that
the only meaning of “state of all its citizens” that is compatible with the
Jewishness of the state is the individualist meaning that seeks equal
individual rights within the state of the Jewish People and does not
challenge the ideological structure of the state. The Jewishness of the
state for Barak is not deﬁned merely on cultural terms, but also demo-
graphic and ethnic terms, namely, the continuity of the majority status
for Jews. Thus, while the Court prevented the Knesset from thwarting
Arab representation, it simultaneously reproduced the political ceiling
under which this representation is permitted.28
Freedom of Speech
A review of the Court’s jurisprudence on free speech shows that there
is a hierarchy of rights: the Palestinian citizens and the Palestinian
residents of the Occupied Territories are not granted the same protec-
tion that the Court grants to the Jewish majority (Salzberger and
Oz-Salzberger 2006). In many cases, including during the 1980s, the
Court allowed the closure or refusal to grant publication permits.
In some of these cases, the Court either ignored the ruling of Kol
Ha’am (1953), or coopted it (by claiming that the governmental
curtailment of free speech has passed the muster of “real and present
danger”), or distinguished the case before it from Kol Ha’am, given the
use of a diﬀerent legal regulation to restrict speech (Salzberger and Oz-
Salzberger 2006). We saw in the abovementioned case of the Nakba
Law that the Court continues its weak protection of Arab citizens’ free
speech rights.
Occasionally, the Court did protect free speech, but this protec-
tion came at a price. The Court annulled the decision of the
Censorship Board to forbid the screening of the movie Jenin,
27 E.A. 11280/2002 Central Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset v. MK Ahmad Tibi
et al., P.D. 57(4) 1 (2003).
28 More recently, the Court approved the Knesset’s decision to increase the electoral thresh-
old for political representation from 2 % to 3.25 % and thus to disadvantage minority
representation. See H.C. 3166/14 and 4857/14 Yehuda Gutman et al. v. Attorney General,
State of Israel (ruling delivered on March 12, 2015). Last accessed September 5, 2016
(http://elyon1.court.gov.il/ﬁles/14/660/031/s13/14031660.s13.htm).
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Jenin by the director Mohammad Bakri.29 This movie sought to
present an alternative, Palestinian narrative to the Israeli narrative
surrounding the Israeli army’s major incursion in the Occupied
Territories and destruction of the Palestinian Authority’s institu-
tions during the so-called Operation Defensive Shield. One can read
this ruling as a protection of a “democratic threshold” and a “major
aid” to the Palestinian minority (Saban 2008). Yet the Court did
not justify the protection in line with classical liberal defenses of
speech as in the market place of ideas in which a variety of views
are heard and from which the truth can emerge. Rather, the Court
reasoned that it was protecting untruthful speech to avoid violence
and critiqued the movie as deceptive and insulting to the Israeli
public. This reasoning makes the Court’s approach “apologetic”
(Salzberger and Oz-Salzberger 2006). Only by endorsing the
Zionist consensus through denying the possibility of an alternative
narrative to the events could the speech of the Palestinian director
be allowed. Only through disparaging the speech (by reframing it as
a lie and marginalizing it) could the speech be heard.
In addition, around the same time of the decision against Bakri’s
documentary, the interior minister decided in December of 2002 to
close the Islamic Movement’s weekly Sawt al-Haq wa al-Hurriyyah
according to the British Mandate’s Press Ordinance of 1933 (Rofeh-
Ofeer and Waked 2002). The Ordinance gives wide discretion to the
minister based on vague and broad provisions (“danger to public safety”).
The minister justiﬁed the closure of the newspaper for two years by
arguing that its content includes incitement to violence and “endangers
public safety.” The Court is implicated in the continued validity of this
Ordinance. It rejected a petition asking the Court to declare some of the
provisions as unconstitutional given their infringement on free speech
and freedom of occupation following the enactment of the basic laws
during the 1990s.30
The Peripheral
Earlier we saw in the case of religious budget distribution that the Court
is reluctant to intervene in state distribution of resources. Yet on other
occasions, the Court has intervened. The case of subsidies and tax
29 H.C. 316/2003 Bakri v. Censorship Board, P.D. 58(1) 249 (2003).
30 H.C. 6652/96 The Association for Civil Rights v. Minister of Interior, P.D. 52(3) 117 (1998).
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beneﬁts is an instance in which the Court limited relatively peripheral
manifestations of discrimination. Yet even in these cases, the delay in the
legal proceedings and lack of implementation made the rulings quite
ineﬀective.
In 1998, the High Follow-Up Committee, the body representing the
Arab citizens, submitted a petition against the governmental classiﬁca-
tion of localities to National Priority A and B. This classiﬁcation
allowed the distribution of greater beneﬁts and incentives to those
communities in the A category. The petition focused on education-
related beneﬁts and argued that this classiﬁcation is discriminatory
given the fact that the government included only 4 Arab communities
(out of 553) within the A category. Eight years after the submission of
the petition, the Court ruled in 2006 that the governmental decision
constituted an illegal discrimination. Yet it gave the government a
one-year period to begin the implementation of the ruling by ceasing
to distribute beneﬁts according to the impermissible classiﬁcation.31
The Court granted the state another extension until 2009. The state
sought another extension through a 2009 law that extended the
implementation of the discriminatory decisions until January, 2012
(Adalah 2010). Following another petition, the state announced that it
intends to comply with the 2006 ruling (Adalah 2011). In other words,
only in 2011 and more than a decade after the original state policy did
the state announce that it will cease to use that speciﬁc discriminatory
policy. During these 12 years or so, the state continued to distribute
beneﬁts in a discriminatory manner to the detriment of the Arab
communities. In this sense, justice delayed – as the saying goes – is
justice denied.
Conclusion
This chapter has laid out the legal structures of subordinating the
Palestinian minority in Israel. For this purpose, it challenges the view
of the Israeli Supreme Court as a liberal, rights-vindicating Court. As far
as the rights of the Palestinian citizens are concerned, the Court has
overall justiﬁed, reﬁned, and advanced their subordination. Far from
being a counter-majoritarian or activist court defending the weak and
the disempowered, it has been an active participant in the evolution of
31 H.C. 2773/98 The High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel v. The Prime
Minister (2006).
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the Zionist project. This chapter presented the primary manifestations of
the Court’s contribution to the dispossession, subordination, segrega-
tion, and control of the Palestinian citizens as well as the legal and
discursive tools it has deployed.
Although the Court has occasionally delivered rulings critical of the
Israeli executive and legislature, these were too few and too limited to
meaningfully challenge existing power structures. They often reﬂected
disagreements regarding the form and extent of discrimination rather
than a rejection of discrimination altogether. The Court eﬀectively legiti-
mated the primary practices of a settler regime by providing it with an
aura of the rule of law. Without that aura, Zionist practices would appear
to be mere raw power and force. The Court depoliticized the oppressive
practices and presented them as more natural and necessary than they
were likely to be perceived without the legal imprimatur (see, e.g.,
Kennedy 1998).
The Court’s dismal record is likely to worsen even further. Since
the Likud’s victory in 1977, the Zionist right wing has been
strengthening its grip on the Israeli political system. The failure
of the Camp David summit in July 2000, the second intifada, and
the October 2000 mass protests have all accelerated this movement
to the right. These developments have led to the evolution of a new
Zionist consensus that seeks to redraw the boundaries of citizenship
in Israel (Rouhana and Sultany 2003). It is too early to tell how this
will inﬂuence the Court’s jurisprudence. Nevertheless, in 2012 the
right-wing politicians secured the appointment of Asher Grunis –
considered by some as “the darling of the right wing” – as the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court (Karpel and Zarchin 2011). In the
same month, Justice Noam Solberg – a resident of the West Bank
settlement Gush Etzion – became the ﬁrst settler to sit on the
Court. With the retirement of former Chief Justice Barak – the
most inﬂuential liberal Zionist judge in the Court’s history – these
changes might signal a right-wing turn in the Court’s jurisprudence
as well. The Court is still likely to uphold a Zionist centrist
position, through its moderating eﬀect, but the political center itself
has been consistently moving rightward.32
32 The Court’s record in 2015, after writing this article, supports this conclusion (Adalah
2015).
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